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How Successful Have Lobbyists Been at Influencing 
State and National Policy to Further the Completion of 
the Dakota Access Pipeline, Since the 2008 US 
Election? 
 
This study sets out to investigate a contemporary example of lobbying, by 
enquiring as to whether lobbyists have successfully influenced state and 
national policy which furthered the completion of the Dakota Access Pipeline 
since 2008. This involves an analysis of campaign contributions made to key 
federal candidates by organisations related to the pipeline. The results of this 
analysis, suggests that lobbyists have been highly successful in influencing 
policy which led to the completion of the pipeline. The data collected in this 
study, highlights lobbyists use of "natural allies" with "proximate objectives" 
(Hall and Deardoff 2006, p.69), creating a network of allies, to enable the 
completion of the pipeline. The study raises concerns over the nature of 
President Trump's relationship with the 'Energy Transfer Partners' CEO, Kelcy 
Warren. Campaign funding and apparent conflicts of interest at state and 
national level and their impact on the democratic process are explored, 
including whether President Trump's personal investments may have played 
a significant role in influencing his policy decisions concerning the pipeline. 
This study helps provide an insight into modern lobbying, revealing the power 
and influence money, through campaign finance, has in the democratic 
system. 
 
Keywords: Dakota Access Pipeline, Lobbying, USA, Donald Trump, Allies, 
Campaign Finance. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2012, oil production reached new highs in North Dakota, because of the rapidly 
growing level of oil extraction from the Bakken formation. The oil boom led to the 
conception of a new pipeline, better known as the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), from 
the Bakken formation to Patoka, Illinois. DAPL caused widespread protests, inspiring a 
large-scale social media movement known as #NoDAPL (NoDAPL 2017), which received 
worldwide news coverage.. Following DAPL from its conception in 2014 (Business Wire, 
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2014) through to President Trump's signing of Executive Order (E.O.) 13766 in 2017, 
this study questions to what extent pro-DAPL lobbyists were successful in influencing 
policies which furthered the completion of the pipeline? The study highlights who these 
lobbyists were, what they achieved, and how. While also providing a contemporary 
example of lobbyists ability to influence policy to benefit the organisations they 
represent. Beginning with the 2008 US Presidential election cycle this study takes an in-
depth look at the campaign contributions of each election cycle up to and including the 
2016 Presidential election. The purpose of this is to evaluate whether contributions 
made by DAPL-related organisations influenced policies and legislation furthering 
DAPL's construction. 
 
This study begins by identifying who the pro-DAPL lobbyists are, which requires looking 
at the companies with a stake in the construction of DAPL. The research then turns to the 
campaign contributions made by these companies, banks and organisations. Before 
discussing how such contributions furthered the construction. Beyond these companies, 
banks and organisations, this study will look at President Trump's financial connections 
to DAPL. Including any contributions, he received during his Presidential campaign in 
2016, as collated by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) (2017), any investments 
Donald Trump made in companies associated with DAPL since 2008. The study also 
examines contributions by lobbyists or organisations representing DAPL to any federal 
candidate running for official office. This includes the contributions made by CEO Kelcy 
Warren of the Energy Transfer Partners (ETP) and Energy Transfer Equity (ETE), as 
disclosed to the FEC (2017). The study finishes with an analysis of the policies which 
benefitted pro-DAPL lobbyists and furthered construction of DAPL, including the battle 
for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and potential violations of other federal 
laws (Cohn 2016). 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Dakota Access Pipeline 
In June 2014, ETP announced the building of "an approximate 1,100-mile crude oil 
pipeline" (Business Wire, 2014), sparking the "largest native American protests in 
modern times" (Penn-Roco 2016, p.176). In September 2016, the Obama administration 
stopped the construction of DAPL (Meyer 2016), in a joint statement the Department of 
Justice, Department of Army and the Department of Interior declared that "Construction 
of the pipeline on Army Corps land bordering or under Lake Oahe will not go forward" 
(DoJ 2016).  The Army declared that they would not authorise the final permits required, 
until they could determine whether they needed to "reconsider any of its previous 
decisions regarding the Lake Oahe site under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) or other federal laws" (DoJ 2016). ETP ignored this request and continued with 
construction, releasing a joint statement with Sunoco Logistics calling the actions of the 
Obama administration "a series of overt and transparent political actions by an 
administration which has abandoned the rule of law" (2016). In January 2017, newly 
inaugurated President Trump signed an E.O. "ordering the Secretary of the Army to 
expedite approval of the Dakota Access Pipeline" (Meyer 2017).  A month later, the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) provided Enbridge, a co-equity holder 
of DAPL, with the final permits required for the construction of DAPL.  
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Lobbying 
As a commonly known and used term in politics and legislation, there are a range of 
definitions for lobbying.  According to, Kabir Hassan et al. "political lobbying is a strategic 
action" (2016, p.126) to "shift market opportunities in favour of the firm and/or the 
operating industry" (Kabir Hassan et. 2016, p.126). Chen et al. expand this definition to 
specify "the political activities [...] engaged in to influence legislators at various levels of 
the government" (2015, p.444). Similar to the US federal level definition for lobbying as 
"any communication made on behalf of a client to" (Chen et al. 2015, p.444) any legislator 
at any federal level "regarding the formation, modification, or adoption of legislation" 
(Chen et al. 2015, p.444).  Despite this focus on definitions around influencing legislators 
to affect and/or shift legislation, Hall and Deardoff (2006) suggest that lobbying has a 
"proximate objective" (p.69). Unlike the definitions of Chen et al. (2015) and Kabir 
Hassan et al. (2016), this objective is "not to change legislators' minds, but to assist 
natural allies in achieving their own, coincident objectives" (Hall and Deardoff 2006, 
p.69). Cave and Rowell (2014) also suggest a similar use of 'allies' in the political system, 
and argue that lobbying "often it is not about changing politicians' minds" (p.234). This 
is a theory Spithoven uses to support his theory that lobbying is defined as "the provision 
of information with the intention to subsidize strategically chosen legislators" (2016, 
p.631). ‘Subsidising’ legislators is core to the theory of Hall and Deardoff (2006) who 
theorised that instead of changing legislators’ minds and making them vote against 
former beliefs, lobbying, "is an attempt to subsidize the legislative resources of members 
who already support the cause of the group" (p.72). However, Mayer (2008) believes 
lobbying has numerous definitions depending on the actors within the process, and "no 
single existing legal definition of lobbying encompasses the entire range" (p.488) 
encompassed by the blanket term of lobbying. Instead a wide number of potential 
definitions "each covers a different, although often overlapping, subset" (Mayer 2008, 
p.488) of lobbying activities.   
 
Many corporations and interest groups see lobbying as simply "a corporate expense" 
(Chen et al. 2015, p.446) of persuasion, which is core to lobbying (Graziano 2001, p.3). 
However, many lobbying tactics have led to many negative connotations being 
associated with the term. DeKieffer claims that many "outside of Washington" (2007, p.1) 
equated the business of lobbying "with all sorts of skulduggery" (2007, p.1).  Mayer 
(2008) goes as far as to connect lobbying with "images of back-room meetings, illicit 
campaign contributions, and other shadowy dealings that undermine democracy" 
(p.486).  Despite these connotations of lobbying, the practice itself is legally well-founded 
and the First Amendment is the "constitutional foundation of lobbying" (Graziano 2001, 
p.11). Spithoven also argues that that further legal founding was "empowered by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission" (2016, 
p.630). This Supreme Court ruling in 2010 not only provided a more concrete legal base 
for lobbying, but also "relaxed constraints on corporate spending on elections" (Chen et 
al. 2015, p.445) through Political Action Committees (PACs). However, despite the 
constitutional foundation of lobbying and the Supreme Court ruling in 2010, the U.S. 
public "decry [the] power of lobbyists" (Saad 2011). These negative connotations remain 
despite various attempts to limit the power of lobbying, such as the 1995 Lobbying 
Disclosure Act (LDA). 
 
 
For this study to determine those lobbying for DAPL, it is important to establish what 
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defines a lobbyist. Benoit (2007) defines a lobbyist as anybody who communicates by 
"any oral, written, or electronic" (p.27) means to an "official that is made on behalf of a 
client with regard to the enumerated subjects" (p.27). Similarly, Graziano (2001) defines 
lobbyists as any "individual, internal or external to the organisation, through whom 
representation is actuated" (p.1).  DeKieffer (2007) takes a broader view proposing a 
lobbyist is "anyone who writes a letter to a member of Congress or questions a candidate 
at a political meeting" (p.1). Similarly, Mayer (2008) views anybody who makes "any 
attempt to influence the actions of government" (p.486) as a lobbyist, meaning 
organisations themselves could be lobbyists.  
 
The job of a lobbyists is to "translate narrow economic powers into industry-wide and 
class-wide powers [...] on the economic front (Beder 2006, p.14). However, in doing so 
lobbyists can "exert undue influence on public policy" (Mayer 2008, p.487), which leads 
to the "concern that interest groups will unduly influence government" (Meyer 2008, 
p.489). However, the core goal of a lobbyist "is to persuade politicians [...] to support 
political acts” that benefit the interests the lobbyist represents (Kabir Hassan et al. 2016, 
p.127). The benefits of successful lobbying can vary from "reductions in regulatory 
compliance costs [to] favorable investing and taxation policies" (Kabir Hassan et al. 2016, 
p.126). Benoit also highlights how "lobbyists [...] help companies save billions of dollars 
each year by influencing policy decisions" (2007, p.41), supported by Faccio (2006) who 
discovered "an average excess return of 2.29 percent whenever a businessperson enters 
politics" (p.383). Therefore, lobbying may contribute to an organisation gaining new 
assets through, for example, legislative or regulatory changes that benefit an industry or 
sector.  
 
Lord (2000) found that for congressional staff, lobbying is the best method an 
organisation or corporation could use to influence the legislative process (p.303) and 
achieve the benefits, eluded to by Kabir Hassan et al. (2016), Benoit (2007), and Faccio 
(2006). Such are the beneficial effects of lobbying to corporations and special interest 
groups alike in the U.S. that "lobbying expenditures grew from $1.47 billion in 1999 to 
$2.61 billion in 2006" (Mayer 2008, p.519), reaching $3,15 billion in 2016 (Statista 
2017). Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) argued that "PACs are willing to spend more on 
committee members because there is less uncertainty about what they are purchasing 
on the committee" (p.1168).  It is because of decreased uncertainty about the benefits 
PAC's will achieve through this form of lobbying that means "committee members 
receive greater contributions" (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, p.1168).  Such PAC 
donations often lead to the firm behind the donation to having "well established access 
to politicians" (Kabir Hassan et al. 2016, p.128), and as Chen et al. tell us "political 
connections lead to better access" (2015, p.446) and greater influence over legislation. 
However, not all PAC and lobby money is used to the benefit of the legislator in power. 
While large amounts of money are provided for "campaign financing and re-election 
support" (Mayer 2008, p.524), PAC and lobby money can be used as a threat. This threat 
largely consists of "electoral opposition" (Mayer 2008, p.524), this threat can be used 
against any elected official. 
 
Academic literature on the topic of lobbying varies from an elaborate discussion on its 
definition, as is the case with Mayer (2008), to precise empirical studies, such as Faccio's 
(2006) on the effect lobbying has on firm performance.  Researching the nature and 
success of lobbying, especially on a specific contemporary example, is not without its 
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difficulties. These difficulties stem from the very nature of lobbying and lobbyists who 
sometimes "strive to keep the public in the dark" (Rampton and Stauber 2002, p.248). 
Previous academic literature can provide a basic blueprint for researching lobbying.  
Mathur et al.'s research involves collecting "annual corporate lobbying data from the 
database compiled by the Center for Responsive politics (CRP)" (2013, p.549), providing 
a tested method to gather accurate lobbying data. Similarly, the LDA used by Mayer 
(2008), provides a clear base from where it is possible to gather lobbying data, as the act 
"requires 'lobbyists' that lobby certain federal government officials to register and report 
on their lobbying activities" (Mayer 2008, p.501). However, much of previous academic 
literature does not provide a research blueprint for the less finance-based side of 
lobbying. There is little to no reliable source for data concerning lobbying through the 
likes of "lavish gifts, lucrative honoraria, [or] comfortable post-government service 
positions" (Mayer 2008, p.524). Given that "much about how interest groups influence 
government remains unclear" (Mayer 2008, p.489), especially the non-financial side to 
lobbying, this study will focus more on the financial side of lobbying using the CRP and 
the LDA to provide secure reliable data on lobbying between 2009 and 2017. 
 
Policy 
The NEPA established a "broad national framework for protecting our environment" 
(EPA 2017), and requires all federal agencies "to consider the environmental impacts of 
their actions [and] inform the public of those potential impacts" (Parfomack et al. 2013 
p.7). NEPA is essential as it "establishes a national policy of promoting harmony between 
man and his environment" (Fang 2012, p.294).   It applies to all "major federal actions" 
(Fang 2012, p.295), including any actions "with effects that may be major and which are 
potentially subject to federal control and responsibility" (Code of Federal Regulations, 
title 40, sec. 1508.18).  The Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA) regulates "discharges of 
pollutants into the waters of the United States" (EPA 2017), setting "water quality 
standards for all contaminants in surface waters" (EPA 2017). The CWA "makes it 
unlawful to discharge any pollutant from a single identifiable source - such as a pipe" 
(Brodwin 2016) into such surface waters. However, the CWA does sporadically allow 
some discharge of pollutant but requires "industrial, municipal, and other facilities" (EPA 
2017). Under the CWA, it is the Office of Water's objective to ensure that "drinking water 
is safe" (EPA 2017), and that the "aquatic ecosystems [...] protect human health, support 
economic and recreational activities" (EPA 2017). 
 
The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA) acknowledges the "importance 
of protecting our nation's [America] heritage" (NCSHPO 2017), and "requires Federal 
agencies to take into account the effects of their undertakings on historic properties" 
(NPS 2012). The NHPA emphasises the importance of the preservation of "historic 
properties to which a Tribe [...] attaches religious or cultural significance" (NPS 2012). 
The agency, through the consultation process, must make "an assessment of adverse 
effects" (ACHP 2013) any undertaking may have on a historic property. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE LOBBYISTS 
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Focusing on the use of campaign finance as a lobbying tactic, this study uses data collated 
by the CRP, as used by Mathur et al. (2013), to pinpoint crucial contributions. These 
contributions are made to key federal candidates in Iowa, Illinois, North and South 
Dakota, where DAPL travels through. These key federal candidates are the Senators and 
certain Representatives from the 2008 election through to the most recent 2016 cycle. 
This study will look at North and South Dakota's Representatives at-large, Iowa's 
Representatives from the 2nd, 3rd, 4th or 5th Congressional Districts before 2013, and 
the 2nd, 3rd, 4th Congressional Districts after 2013. The key Representatives in Illinois 
are from the 17th, 18th and 19th Districts before 2013, and then the 13th, 15th and 18th 
Congressional Districts post-2013. Focusing on campaign contributions, organisations 
with a stake in DAPL are the lobbyists in the study, as they "attempt to influence the 
actions of government" (Mayer 2008, p.486). These organisations include the companies 
involved in the ownership, construction and funding of the pipeline. LittleSis (2016) 
reports that Bakken Holdings LLC are controlled by ETP and Sunoco Logistics and 
controls a 75% stake in the fortunes of DAPL. Meanwhile, a joint venture between 
Marathon Petroleum (MP) and Enbridge Energy Partners bought a 36.75% interest for 
"$2 billion" (Energy Transfer and Sunoco Logistics 2016) in DAPL, with the remaining 
25% stake of DAPL belonging to Phillips 66 (P66) (Energy Transfer Partners 2016). ETP 
and Sunoco Logistics received funding of an estimated $6.25 billion by thirty banks, 
(LittleSis 2016), who also made significant campaign contributions. ETP received $3.75 
billion from twenty-six banks, with the largest donors providing $185 million in political 
donations (United States Securities and Exchange Commission 2015). Meanwhile, 
Sunoco Logistics received $2.5 Billion from twenty-four banks, with many pledging 
campaign funding of up to $130 million (Sunoco Logistics 2016). These banks are all 
stakeholders in DAPL, justifying the analysis of the campaign contributions they have 
made included here. 
 
Figure 1 shows that since 2008 the corporations involved in the construction of DAPL 
have made $295,800 worth of contributions (CRP 2017) to eighteen key federal 
candidates. Through the Energy Transfer Employee Management Company PAC, ETP 
made $52,000 (CRP 2017) in contributions to eleven key candidates. Similarly, ETE, the 
effective owner of Sunoco Logistics and ETP (Energy Transfer 2017), began extensively 
contributing to key candidates across the Dakotas, Iowa and Illinois in 2014, the same 
year as the DAPL announcement. By the end of 2016, ETE made a total of $78,188 in 
contributions to fourteen candidates (CRP 2017). This suggests that the ETP PAC and 
ETE may have begun making campaign finance contributions to get what Democratic 
Presidential hopeful Bernie Sanders described as "their pound of flesh" (Sanders 2016) 
in favours from federal candidates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: All Contributions to Key Federal Candidates and Parties from Corporations and 
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PACs 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows, since 2008 thirty-one key federal candidates, including Presidents 
Obama and Trump and Vice President Mike Pence, received a total $10,261,925 in 
contributions from the banks involved in funding the pipeline (CRP 2017). Ten of the 
recipients had gathered over $50,000 in contributions, including five who received over 
$98,000 (CRP 2017). The main recipient of bank contributions was President Obama. 
However, many of the contributions made to President Obama, by the banks were likely 
meant to elicit political support for the broader banking sector, rather than specifically 
for DAPL. This lobbying needs to be seen in the context of the financial crisis of 2008, in 
which eleven of the banks funding DAPL also received U.S. government bailouts from 
President Obama (ProPublica 2017). When President Obama's contributions are taken 
away, these key candidates received $3,275,192 since 2008 (CRP 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: All Contributions to Key Federal Candidates and Parties from all Banks 
Recipient 
Year 
Total ($) 
2008 ($) 2010 ($) 2012 ($) 2014 ($) 2016 ($) 
Pres. Barack Obama  -     -     15,948.00   -     -     15,948.00  
Pres. Donald Trump  -     -     -     -     24,602.00   24,602.00  
Rep. Aaron Schock (R-IL)  -     -     10,000.00   5,000.00   -     15,000.00  
Rep. Bill 'Bobby' Schilling (R-IL)  -     -     2,500.00   -     -     2,500.00  
Rep. Darin LaHood (R-IL)  -     -     -     -     7,500.00   7,500.00  
Rep. David Loebsack (D-IA)  -     -     -     6,000.00   5,000.00   11,000.00  
Rep. David Young (R-IA)  -     -     -     5,000.00   7,000.00   12,000.00  
Rep. John Shimkus (R-IL)  2,000.00   -     12,000.00   15,000.00   18,000.00   47,000.00  
Rep. Kevin Cramer (R-ND)  -     -     -     3,000.00   16,000.00   19,000.00  
Rep. Kristi Noem (R-SD)  -     -     -     6,000.00   5,000.00   11,000.00  
Rep. Peter Roskam (R-IL)  1,000.00   -     4,000.00   14,500.00   6,000.00   25,500.00  
Rep. Rick Berg (R-ND)  -     -     5,000.00   -     -     5,000.00  
Rep. Rodney Davis (R-IL)  -     -     6,000.00   7,000.00   3,000.00   16,000.00  
Rep. Steven King (R-IA)  -     -     -     7,000.00   -     7,000.00  
Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA)  -     -     -     10,000.00   8,500.00   18,500.00  
Sen. Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND)  -     -     2,500.00   5,500.00   -     8,000.00  
Sen. John Hoeven (R-ND)  -     -     -     -     16,500.00   16,500.00  
Sen. John Thune (R-SD)  1,000.00   -     -     -     15,000.00   16,000.00  
Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA)  -     -     -     15,000.00   -     15,000.00  
Sen. Mike Rounds (R-SD)  -     -     -     2,750.00   -     2,750.00  
Total Contributions to Key 
Candidates ($) 
 4,000.00   -     57,948.00   101,750.00   132,102.00   295,800.00  
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Figure 3 shows, Rep. Shimkus benefitted highly from both the companies and banks. 
Shimkus has also been a long supporter of oil pipelines going through Illinois. In 2013, 
Shimkus voiced his support for DAPL's sister pipeline, 'Keystone XL'. With his support 
for pipelines clear, the objective of lobbying Shimkus would have been to help secure his 
place in the political system as an ally with a "proximate objective" (Hall and Deardoff 
2006, p.69). Shimkus, showed his worth to the oil and gas industry when he declared his 
intention to create "practical reforms to promote the expansion of domestic 
infrastructure and manufacturing" (Siciliano 2017) when speaking as Chairman of the 
Environment Subcommittee. Shimkus' subcommittee later spoke of how they wished to 
"make pipeline approvals easier" (Cama 2017). Highlighting Shimkus' ability to "support 
political acts that benefit the lobbying firm" (Kabir Hassan et al. 2016, p.127). Such 
actions highlight the fears that "Washington is wired to work for the big guys" (Warren 
2016), and how issues of concern to the public may be given a lower priority than those 
of powerful corporations. 
 
Rep. Roskam (R-IL) was another significant recipient of contributions from both the 
Recipient 
Year 
Total ($) 
2008 ($) 2010 ($) 2012 ($) 2014 ($) 2016 ($) 
Pres. Barack Obama  5,114,805.00   -    
 
1,856,016.0
0  
 1,157.00   14,755.00   6,986,733.00  
Pres. Donald Trump  -     -     -     -     277,436.00   277,436.00  
Rep. & Sen. Mark Kirk (R-IL)  112,300.00   204,135.00   8,000.00   51,150.00   111,400.00   486,985.00  
Rep. Aaron Schock (R-IL)  9,250.00   14,200.00   47,000.00   72,000.00   7,600.00   150,050.00  
Rep. Bill 'Bobby' Schilling (R-
IL) 
 -     2,050.00   17,400.00   1,250.00   -     20,700.00  
Rep. Darin LaHood (R-IL)  -     -     -     -     10,850.00   10,850.00  
Rep. David Loebsack (D-IA)  1,250.00   1,000.00   6,250.00   5,550.00   6,703.00   20,753.00  
Rep. David Young (R-IA)  -     -     -     33,500.00   32,540.00   66,040.00  
Rep. Earl Pomeroy (D-ND)  45,725.00   21,500.00   -     -     -     67,225.00  
Rep. John Shimkus (R-IL)  12,500.00   7,400.00   7,240.00   1,000.00   8,000.00   36,140.00  
Rep. Kevin Cramer (R-ND)  -     -     3,000.00   2,000.00   -     5,000.00  
Rep. Kristi Noem (R-SD)  -     15,900.00   24,583.00   34,400.00   43,000.00   117,883.00  
Rep. Leonard Boswell (D-IA)  11,000.00   2,500.00   500.00   -     -     14,000.00  
Rep. Peter Roskam (R-IL)  55,471.00   54,600.00   112,650.00   91,001.00   87,900.00   401,622.00  
Rep. Rick Berg (R-ND)  -     5,750.00   116,138.00   -     -     121,888.00  
Rep. Rodney Davis (R-IL)  -     -     7,000.00   27,840.00   20,500.00   55,340.00  
Rep. Stephanie Herseth 
Sandlin (D-SD) 
 21,500.00   33,000.00   -     -     -     54,500.00  
Rep. Steven King (R-IA)  2,750.00   -     2,000.00   450.00   1,100.00   6,300.00  
Rep. Tom Latham (R-IA)  17,750.00   16,300.00   29,500.00   12,500.00   -     76,050.00  
Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND)  4,000.00   7,550.00   -     -     -     11,550.00  
Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA)  5,500.00   40,500.00   -     1,000.00   53,450.00   100,450.00  
Sen. Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND)  -     -     30,200.00   36,500.00   34,500.00   101,200.00  
Sen. John Hoeven (R-ND)  -     31,700.00   1,000.00   2,000.00   28,000.00   62,700.00  
Sen. John Thune (R-SD)  16,050.00   111,900.00   27,500.00   47,150.00   60,470.00   263,070.00  
Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA)  -     -     -     49,050.00   250.00   49,300.00  
Sen. Kent Conrad (D-ND)  1,500.00   9,000.00   -     -     -     10,500.00  
Sen. Mike Rounds (R-SD)  -     -     2,500.00   109,400.00   10,000.00   121,900.00  
Sen. Richard 'Dick' Durbin (D-
IL) 
 141,925.00   2,200.00   8,000.00   12,250.00   6,150.00   170,525.00  
Sen. Tim Johnson (D-SD)  138,295.00   13,500.00   131,500.00   -     -     283,295.00  
Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA)  91,040.00   500.00   1,900.00   -     -     93,440.00  
VPres. Mike Pence  5,000.00   13,500.00   -     -     -     18,500.00  
Total Contributions to Key 
Candidates ($) 
 5,807,611.00   608,685.00  
 
2,439,877.0
0  
 591,148.00   814,604.00   10,261,925.00  
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banks and companies (CRP 2017), as is shown in Figure 3. In 2015, Roskam released a 
statement in which he praised the approval of DAPL's sister pipeline, 'Keystone XL', 
highlighting how the pipeline will reduce "dependency on foreign oil" (Peter Roskam 
2015). In the same statement, Roskam targeted President Obama for "six years of 
obstruction" (Peter Roskam 2015) against the pipeline. Roskam is also a key player 
amongst House Republicans as the Chief Deputy Whip. This allows Roskam to provide 
significant support to "political acts that benefit" (Kabir Hassan et al. 2016, p.127) those 
who have funded his re-election campaigns, a tactic Mayer (2008) suggests is widely 
used by lobbyists (p.524). During the 2014 election campaign, Roskam was challenged 
by Democrat Michael Mason. Mason took a firm stand against the use of fossil fuels, and 
made it clear throughout his campaign that "Tar sands from Canada [similar to the 
Bakken formation in North Dakota] are not the long-term answer" (Library of Congress 
2014). Therefore, Mason's election would have been a significant obstacle in the 
permitting of pipelines, including DAPL. In 2014, as is allowed by the 2010 Citizens 
United decision, Roskam received $14,500 from DAPL companies.   
 
Similar patterns can be seen in the 2012 and 2014 election campaigns of Rep. Davis (R-
IL). Davis against Democratic candidate David Gill, in 2012, who advocated for 
"sustainable energy policy" (Library of Congress 2012). In 2014, Ann Callis called for 
"harnessing wind, solar and other resources to grow a local alternative energy economy" 
(Library of Congress 2014). Meanwhile, Davis received $ 55,340 (CRP 2017) from DAPL 
companies in these elections. Then in 2013, Davis spoke in favour of DAPL's sister 
pipeline (U.S. Rep. Rodney Davis 2013), before showing his support for E.O. 13766 in 
2017 (Rodney Davis 2017). Campaign donations of this kind alongside election 
advertising in support of candidates or attacking the record of their opponents happen 
because of the Supreme Court's ruling on the Citizens United case in 2010 which 
"loosened restrictions on political expenditures" (Holman 2016). 
 
Rep. Kevin Cramer (R-ND) has been a major recipient of contributions from the 
companies behind DAPL who has shown consistent support for the pipelines in North 
Dakota (Kevin Cramer 2015). These contributions helped secure his position in the 
political system as a crucial ally, as discussed by Cave and Rowell (2014, p.234). Cramer 
serves on the House Energy and Commerce Committee, with subcommittee assignments 
on the Energy, and Environment subcommittees. President Trump has also used Cramer 
as a prominent energy policy advisor in the knowledge Cramer is "one of the country's 
most ardent oil and gas drilling advocates" (Volcovici and Flitter 2016). Following the 
signing of E.O. 13766, Cramer took to YouTube to praise President Trump's decision, 
declaring he was "so, so grateful" (Kevin Cramer 2017). Beyond the "proximate 
objectives" (Hall and Deardoff 2006, p.69) Cramer and DAPL align together, Cramer used 
his political power to ensure support for the completion of DAPL. Sen. John Hoeven (R-
ND) received $16,500 from DAPL companies, while showing strong political support by 
promising that security would be "bulked up" (Kormann 2017) as protesters would be 
moved on and any "upswell in protest would be quashed" (Kormann 2017).  
 
Cramer and Hoeven found support in expelling pipeline protesters through North Dakota 
Governor Jack Dalrymple. The Governor declared "a state of emergency to deal with 
peaceful oil pipeline protesters" (Cook 2016), as he "activated the National Guard" 
(Democracy Now 2016) to support the police in moving the protesters out of their camp. 
The move followed reports that DA had "unleashed dogs and pepper spray" (Democracy 
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Now 2017). Governor Dalrymple was a large recipient of the Energy and Natural 
Resources sector contributions (Vote Smart 2017). In doing so Cramer, Hoeven, and 
Dalrymple moved beyond being passive allies of the DAPL projects, to allies actively 
aiding the passage of the pipeline and helping move it towards completion. These actions 
feed into the debate that elected officials are more beholden to campaign finance 
contributors than those who voted them in. In this case of evicting protesters, this debate 
was dragged to extremes as public services, like the National Guard, were used against 
peaceful members of the public raising the question of whether Citizens United (2010) 
has allowed corporations to not only ‘buy’ politicians, but also the public services meant 
to protect the electorate. 
   
Sen. Thune (R-SD), who received $279,070 (CRP 2017) of campaign contributions as is 
seen in Figure 3, has served on the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation since 2013 and currently serves as chairman of the Committee. Under 
Thune's leadership, this committee has jurisdiction, and therefore high levels of 
influence, over legislation relating to "inland waterways [and] pipelines" (John Thune 
2017), such as the Mississippi River which is a key water supply to the local Tribe. Thune 
is also a strong advocate for "advancements in oil extraction [and] expansive oil 
production from the Bakken formation in neighbouring North Dakota" (John Thune 
2017), making him a valuable ally in the completion of DAPL. An ally, whose policy record 
since 2001 shows that he is willing to consistently vote against environmental 
protections or any action on climate change and in favour of oil and gas exploration (On 
the Issues 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: All Contributions to Key Federal Candidates from all Banks, Corporations 
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and PAC's 
 
Recipient 
Year 
Total ($) 
2008 ($) 2010 ($) 2012 ($) 2014 ($) 2016 ($) 
Pres. Barack Obama  5,114,805.00   -     1,871,964.00   1,157.00   14,755.00   7,002,681.00  
Pres. Donald Trump  -     -     -     -     302,038.00   302,038.00  
Rep. & Sen. Mark Kirk (R-IL)  112,300.00   204,135.00   8,000.00   51,150.00   111,400.00   486,985.00  
Rep. Aaron Schock (R-IL)  9,250.00   14,200.00   57,000.00   77,000.00   7,600.00   165,050.00  
Rep. Bill 'Bobby' Schilling (R-IL)  -     2,050.00   19,900.00   1,250.00   -     23,200.00  
Rep. Darin LaHood (R-IL)  -     -     -     -     18,350.00   18,350.00  
Rep. David Loebsack (D-IA)  1,250.00   1,000.00   6,250.00   11,550.00   11,703.00   31,753.00  
Rep. David Young (R-IA)  -     -     -     38,500.00   39,540.00   78,040.00  
Rep. Earl Pomeroy (D-ND)  45,725.00   21,500.00   -     -     -     67,225.00  
Rep. John Shimkus (R-IL)  14,500.00   7,400.00   19,240.00   16,000.00   26,000.00   83,140.00  
Rep. Kevin Cramer (R-ND)  -     -     3,000.00   5,000.00   16,000.00   24,000.00  
Rep. Kristi Noem (R-SD)  -     15,900.00   24,583.00   40,400.00   48,000.00   128,883.00  
Rep. Leonard Boswell (D-IA)  11,000.00   2,500.00   500.00   -     -     14,000.00  
Rep. Peter Roskam (R-IL)  56,471.00   54,600.00   116,650.00   105,501.00   93,900.00   427,122.00  
Rep. Rick Berg (R-ND)  -     5,750.00   121,138.00   -     -     126,888.00  
Rep. Rodney Davis (R-IL)  -     -     13,000.00   34,840.00   23,500.00   71,340.00  
Rep. Stephanie Herseth Sandlin (D-
SD) 
 21,500.00   33,000.00   -     -     -     54,500.00  
Rep. Steven King (R-IA)  2,750.00   -     2,000.00   7,450.00   1,100.00   13,300.00  
Rep. Tom Latham (R-IA)  17,750.00   16,300.00   29,500.00   12,500.00   -     76,050.00  
Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND)  4,000.00   7,550.00   -     -     -     11,550.00  
Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA)  5,500.00   40,500.00   -     11,000.00   61,950.00   118,950.00  
Sen. Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND)  -     -     32,700.00   42,000.00   34,500.00   109,200.00  
Sen. John Hoeven (R-ND)  -     31,700.00   1,000.00   2,000.00   44,500.00   79,200.00  
Sen. John Thune (R-SD)  17,050.00   111,900.00   27,500.00   47,150.00   75,470.00   279,070.00  
Sen. Joni Ernst (R-IA)  -     -     -     64,050.00   250.00   64,300.00  
Sen. Kent Conrad (D-ND)  1,500.00   9,000.00   -     -     -     10,500.00  
Sen. Mike Rounds (R-SD)  -     -     2,500.00   112,150.00   10,000.00   124,650.00  
Sen. Richard 'Dick' Durbin (D-IL)  141,925.00   2,200.00   8,000.00   12,250.00   6,150.00   170,525.00  
Sen. Tim Johnson (D-SD)  138,295.00   13,500.00   131,500.00   -     -     283,295.00  
Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA)  91,040.00   500.00   1,900.00   -     -     93,440.00  
VPres. Mike Pence  5,000.00   13,500.00   -     -     -     18,500.00  
Total Contributions to Key 
Candidates ($) 
 5,811,611.00   608,685.00   2,497,825.00   692,898.00   946,706.00  
 
10,557,725.00  
       
The data uncovered in the analysis of the contributions made by the banks and 
companies behind DAPL helps build upon many of the debates in the US political arena. 
Most notably whether the Supreme Court ruling in 2010, on the Citizens United case, has 
irreversibly blurred the line between bribery and lobbying. This data suggests, as 
Wertheimer and Manes (1994) argue, that "elected representatives are so indebted to 
the special-interest donors [...] they are losing their ability to provide their best 
judgement" (p.1127) for those who elected them.  
 
 
DONALD TRUMP 
 
On 16th June 2015, New York businessman Donald Trump officially announced that he 
would be running for the Presidency of the United States. Donald Trump would go on to 
become the "only US President ever with no political or military experience" (Crockett, 
2017). However, through his business career, Donald Trump made numerous political 
actions., including posts on social media, campaign finance contributions, and 
investments in government-backed projects.  In 2016 during his presidential campaign, 
Trump received $22,087 (CRP 2017) in contributions from ETE and MP, as is shown in 
figure 4, both making above company-average contributions to his campaign (CRP 
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2017). These contributions hold high levels of significance because, unlike the banks, 
ETE and MP have a far more limited range of lobbying interests. ETE and MP both have 
the primary objective of securing the completion of DAPL. Therefore, the contributions 
made to Trump by ETE and MP are more likely to be deliberate attempts to "influence 
legislators" (Chen et al. 2015, p.444) - in this case President Trump in the hope he would 
further the completion of DAPL.  
 
After receiving the contributions, broken down in figure 4, Donald Trump was 
inaugurated as President, on 20th January 2017. Trump then signed E.O. 13766 on the 
24th January 2017, four days after being sworn in. This E.O. was designed to push 
through the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline and DAPL (Garcia 2017). Given the 
speed at which Trump signed this E.O. it is likely that the construction of DAPL was a high 
priority to Trump. This E.O. clearly shifted the "market opportunities in favor" (Kabir 
Hassan et al. 2016, p.126) of those supporting DAPL. The day following Trump signing 
E.O. 13766, the Shares of ETP rose by "more than 7.5%, hitting its highest level since mid-
November" (Bukhari 2017). ETP's stock also took a similar jump on November 9th 
(Market Watch 2017), when Trump was elected U.S. President (Flegenheimer and 
Barbaro 2016). MP's stock also jumped up upon the signing of E.O. 13766 and P66 also 
saw similar stock values jump on these occasions (Market Watch 2017). Such cause and 
effects of campaign contributions are a prime example of what Former President Jimmy 
Carter warned of when he declared that America had become a "an oligarchy with 
unlimited political bribery” that had witnessed: 
"a complete subversion [of the] political system as a payoff to major contributors, 
who want and expect, and sometimes get favors for themselves after the election's 
over" (Thon Hartmann Program 2015).  
These fears are founded in the evolution of the American political system where the ideal 
of 'one vote, one person' and 'an equal voice for all', are being diminished by corporations 
dumping "billions of dollars into the political process to buy elections for politicians who 
will be beholden to them" (Sanders 2016, p.189). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Contributions made to Presidential Candidate Donald Trump in 2016 
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Contributing Bank, Corporation or PAC Contribution made ($) 
Bank of America  67,825.00  
Barclays  2,585.00  
BBVA Compass (Compass Bank)  1,000.00  
BBVA Securities (Compass Bank)  342.00  
Citizens Bank  1,250.00  
Comerica  858.00  
Enbridge Energy Partners  184.00  
Energy Transfer Equity  14,038.00  
Goldman Sachs  4,391.00  
HSBC Holdings  2,748.00  
JPMorgan Chase & Co  19,385.00  
Marathon Petroleum  8,049.00  
PNC Financial Services  3,290.00  
Royal Bank of Canada  5,890.00  
Royal Bank of Scotland  610.00  
Societe General  680.00  
UBS AG  28,262.00  
Total  161,387.00  
 
On the 19th September 2016, the Wisconsin Democratic Party called upon Trump to 
release his tax returns (2016). Senator Tammy Baldwin was quoted saying, it "is way 
past due for Donald Trump to release his tax returns" (Democratic Party of Wisconsin 
2016). At the time of this study, Trump is yet to release any tax returns, but on 15th 
March 2017, Trump's 2005 tax return was leaked over Twitter (Stein 2017). While it is 
felt, this leak fell out of the appropriate scope of this study the CRP (2017) has released 
Trump's financial disclosure forms for 2014 and 2015, filed in 2015 and 2016 
respectively. They reveal the reported value of Trump's investments in various 
organisations including numerous DAPL stakeholders. The value of Trump's investments 
in these banks and corporations may have reached a top value of $20,761,000 (CRP 
2017), including investments in ten banks involved in funding DAPL. Additionally, 
President Trump had sizable investments in two companies directly involved in the 
construction of DAPL, ETP and P66. Overall Trump stood to gain approximately $1.3 
million out of the success of ETP and P66 (CRP 2017). Trump supported these 
investments, with additional investments in various key DAPL candidates’ campaigns. 
Trump has been making political contributions throughout the focus period of this study. 
However, Trump was most generous to key candidates in the 2014 and 2016 election 
cycles, contributing $23,800 (CRP 2017), including to the Iowa Republican Party. 
 
It remains unclear how much Trump had invested in these companies when signing E.O. 
13766. Further release of Trump's taxes or financial disclosure would be required to 
determine an exact value. However, during the Presidential transition period over 2016 
and 2017, any claims that Trump's investments were a source of conflict of interest were 
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curtly dismissed (Revesz 2016); as was any discussion of how much President had 
invested in other companies which may be a source of conflict. Despite the claims of the 
Trump transition team, that his former business investments would have no effect on his 
Presidential decision making. The fact that one of his first actions as President, E.O. 
13766, directly affected investments he may have, calls into question the democratic 
nature of a President with split interests. Should the President act in a manner which 
deliberately effects positive personal fiscal outcomes through legislation signed by 
themselves, or does this fall under the definition of a corrupt action? 
 
Although we are unable to determine the exact level President Trump has invested in 
ETP or P66, at the time of passing E.O. 13766, we can pinpoint how much Kelcy Warren, 
the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors at ETP, who also 
"serves as Chairman of the Board of Director" (Energy Transfer 2017) at ETE, invested 
in the success of Trump. Over the course of three separate contributions, Warren 
contributed a total of $103,000 to Donald Trump's official campaign and the Trump 
Victory fund (FEC 2016). The Federal Election Commission (FEC) reports that Warren 
made a maximum contribution to the Trump campaign of $2,700 (FEC 2016), however, 
another $300 contribution was also made separately by Warren. These two 
contributions may have broken FEC rules, as it exceeds the maximum contribution 
allowance to an individual campaign (FEC 2016). In addition to the $103,000 Warren 
contributed to Trump, he also contributed $66,800 to the Republican National 
Committee (FEC 2016). These payments were made a month after Trump sealed enough 
delegates to win the Republican nomination (BBC 2016). The positions held by Warren 
in ETP and ETE, provide a clear incentive for him to attempt to "persuade [Trump's] 
support [for] political acts that benefit" (Kabir Hassan et al. 2016, p.127) Warren's 
corporations. Given that DAPL is a multi-billion-dollar project, it is highly likely that 
Warren, as CEO and Chairman of ETP and ETE, would see a significant monetary benefit 
from the success of the project: a benefit which is reflected in the stock value jumps of 
ETP. Therefore, this gives Warren a high incentive, both personally and corporately, that 
he should do all within his power to ensure its success. The potential monetary gains 
from the project’s success are very likely to outweigh the cost of $169,800 worth of 
contributions (FEC 2016) and were, in all likelihood, made to help influence the 
legislative process (Lord 2000, p.303). It is possible that Warren hoped any influence 
these payments had on the legislative process would benefit his company through 
"reductions in regulatory compliance costs, increases in government procurement 
contracts, increases in protective trade or industrial entry barriers" (Kabir Hassan et al. 
2016, p.126). Without access to any logs made during meetings between Warren and 
Trump, it is not possible to determine whether an E.O. was discussed. 
 
 
TARGETED POLICY 
 
To build DAPL, the USACE are required to "comply with several environmental laws" 
(Brodwin 2016), including the NEPA and the CWA. These were passed for the protection 
of the environment which supports both human activity and wildlife, many argue that 
pipelines, like DAPL, violate these laws. These arguments include studies such as the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) report in 2017 which, 
since 1997, found a total of 11,462 significant pipeline incidents in the US, leading to 324 
fatalities (2017).  The PHMSA also reports 1,331 injuries and more than $7 Billion worth 
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of reported costs (2017). Additionally, studies have shown that those exposed to oil-
contaminated water are more likely to contract various forms of cancer (Gay et al. 2010, 
p.67), amongst other adverse health effects. 
 
On the 23rd September 2016 UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples, 
Victoria Tauli-Corpuz called on the United States to halt the construction of the pipeline, 
which posed "a significant risk to the drinking water of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe" 
(Cohn 2016). The Tribe also believed that the pipeline "would damage and destroy sites 
of great historic, religious, and cultural significance to the Tribe" (Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe 2016). Despite such fears, the USACE issued multiple federal authorizations 
needed to construct the pipeline leading to Tribal accusations of multiple violations 
"including the Clean Water Act, National Historic Preservation Act and National 
Environmental Policy Act" (Cohn 2016). 
 
According to Cohn (2016) NEPA's basic policy is to ensure that the government considers 
the potential environmental impacts of any federal project, but the EA for DAPL 
concluded in a FONSI (USACE 2016) leading the Tribe to claim the "review process [...] 
was not done properly" (Brodwin 2016). In response, the Obama administration 
announced that "the Army will not authorize constructing DAPL on Corps land" (DOJ 
2016), with the need "to explore alternate routes" (Gajanan 2016), making an EIS 
essential for the pipeline construction to move forward. However, before the EIS could 
be carried out President Trump was sworn in. Trump, who months earlier received 
donations over $100,000 from ETP CEO Kelcy Warren, "canceled the EIS process, waived 
other regulatory requirements and allowed for immediate construction" (Brodwin 
2016) of the pipeline. It was believed that the EIS process would have revealed " possible 
harms [of the original pipeline route] and alternative routes [would] have taken years to 
complete" (Brodwin 2016). This would have left the pipeline unused with a massive cost 
to the companies involved with it. Per Kabir Hassan et al. (2016, p.127), Trump’s decision 
highlights a clear benefit of successful lobbying by the stakeholders of DAPL who risked 
a loss of profit. 
 
E.O. 13766 allowed the pipeline to avoid further questions concerning the CWA and the 
risks posed to "the Missouri River is [...] the tribe's only source of water" (Meyer 2016). 
The purpose of the CWA was to prevent the many health concerns, which are raised by 
Gay et al. (2010), and address fears that an incident could "send oil deep into the Missouri 
River" (Brodwin 2016). Similar fears meant a provisional route for DAPL (ETP 2014, 
p.22), was rejected after the residents of Bismarck expressed fears it would have 
jeopardised their water supply (Cohn 2016).  However, ETP were more willing to risk 
the water supply of the Native American Tribe, than the water supply of the prominently 
white citizens of Bismarck, an act described as a "violation of the non-discrimination 
principle" (Cohn 2016) and "environmental racism" (Thorbecke 2016). However, the 
lack of an EIS meant that such concerns went unresolved in the construction of the 
pipeline.. Chairman Archambault II claims that "permits for the project were approved 
and construction began without meaningful consultation" (Cohn 2016), meant to be 
guaranteed by state government officials. Instead, the cultural resource surveys, 
conducted for permit approval of the pipeline, "were conducted by out-of-state, non-
tribal consultants of the company seeking to build the pipeline" (Cohn 2016), which 
meant the Tribe had little to no opportunity to express their fears. This scenario, claims 
Penn-Roco, highlights "the difference between consultation and meaningful 
JOURNAL OF PROMOTIONAL COMMUNICATIONS                                        Lobbying State and National Policy in the US 
 
 
 
 
61 
consultation" (2016, p.178). By using non-Standing Rock Sioux tribal consultants, ETP 
potentially violated article 18 of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (2007). 
 
The use of Eminent domain, which gives the government the power to "compulsorily 
purchase land" (Free Dictionary 2017) from a private owner, became a crucial tool in 
constructing DAPL. In 2016, the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) granted Dakota Access (DA) 
the power of eminent domain to construct DAPL (IUB 2016). This move was greatly 
supported by Iowa Governor Terry Branstad (R), who in 2015 voiced his support of the 
use of eminent domain in cases related to pipeline projects (Petroski 2015). Branstad 
has received $228,811 in contributions from the Oil and Gas industry, and a further 
$158,581 from the Miscellaneous Energy industry (Vote Smart 2017). Branstad also 
received $25,000 from Donald Trump and $16,000 from WF (Vote Smart 2017). DA's use 
of eminent domain led to complaints from Iowan farmers unhappy with the damage the 
construction of the pipeline will has had on their farm soil (Fallon 2016). The elected 
officials disregard of these complaints highlights the potential for them to be beholden 
under special interests’ group's campaign contributions, which "undermines the 
determination of the representatives to deliver the public what is most wants and needs" 
(Gottlieb 1989, p.282) 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The most damning outcome of this study is the campaign contributions made, by ETP 
CEO Kelcy Warren, to Trump's Presidential campaign (FEC 2017). Most worryingly about 
these contributions is that they, along with other financial incentives accruing from 
Donald Trump’s personal investments, may have contributed to the hasty signing of E.O. 
13766 and the prompt completion of DAPL (Garcia 2017). Similarly, the contributions 
from ETE and MP who contributed significant sums to Trump (CRP 2017) for the safe 
passage of pro-DAPL legislation which gave little regard to the environmental, cultural, 
or legal fears of the Standing Rock Tribe (Cohn 2016). Equally worrying are the possible 
business ties between Trump and companies (CRP 2017) involved in the construction of 
DAPL, and the arising conflict of interest between Trump's investments and his 
Presidency. Although we cannot determine precisely what Trump currently has invested 
in ETP and P66, or other DAPL related companies; his consistent reluctance to release 
up to date tax returns (Rosza 2017) allows for continuing suspicions of conflicts of 
interest between his investments and the Presidency.  
 
Away from the Presidency, the signs that lobbyists are overwhelmingly powerful, within 
the legislative process persist. This power comes in the form of campaign finance, which 
creates "natural allies" (Hall and Deardoff 2006, p.69) within the political system. 
Campaign contributions (Mayer 2008) keep these allies in the political system where 
they can work to the benefit of lobbyists with "coincident plans" (Cave and Rowell 2014, 
p.234). For DAPL these "natural allies" (Hall and Deardoff 2006, p.69) were the likes of 
Rep. Cramer (R-ND) and Sen. Hoeven (R-ND) who helped clear protesters away from the 
pipeline; and Rep. Shimkus (R-IL) who helped create a legislative environment highly 
beneficial to pipelines. Such allies were secured with campaign finance which helped 
them gain victory over anti-pipeline candidates, such as Rep. Roskam (R-IL) in 2014 
against anti-pipeline Democratic candidate Mason. 
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This study cannot say for certain the intentions of the contributions made by the 
organisations discussed in the research. Nor is it possible for this study to determine 
whether policy decision makers were swayed by the contributions, or that the policy 
issues were ever discussed with them in relation to DAPL. This study cannot take "lavish 
gifts, lucrative honoraria, [and] even pleasant companionship" (Mayer 2008, p.524) into 
account. This is not the fault of this study alone; such fault is systemic throughout 
lobbying research with no reliable source for such lobbying tactics. Further research 
would be required to determine the true effectiveness of campaign contributions on 
policy decisions. This research might include interviews with government officials about 
the impact of campaign contributions over policy decisions. Were officials forthcoming 
and able to offer evidence of the impact of campaign finance, such research could help 
determine just how much power of influence lobbyists have of policy makers. Despite 
the absence of detailed research of this kind, this study is confident in suggesting that 
lobbyists have been highly successful in influencing state and national policy to further 
the completion of DAPL, since 2008.  
 
The conclusions drawn from this study help to create a contemporary example of the 
extent to which lobbying can influence legislation and policy, to their benefit. The case of 
DAPL shows how through a network of "natural allies" (Hall and Deardoff 2006, p.69) 
and campaign financing, lobbying can lead to the direct reversing of a policy decision 
taken by a former administration. Along with Mayer (2008), this study associates the 
practice of lobbying with images of "campaign contributions and other shadowy dealings 
that undermine democracy (p.486). This study also suggests that lobbyists do exert a 
high level of "undue influence" (Gottlieb 1989, p.282) on policy makers. This study 
further raises the issue of uncapped money in politics, leading to representatives no 
longer getting "their just powers from the consent of the governed" (Library of Congress 
2017). Instead, the power to govern is coming from special interest groups, corporations 
and "extraordinary wealthy people [who] dump billions of dollars into the political 
process" (Sanders 2016, p.189). This effectively creates a political system "tainted with 
corruption" (Lowenstein 1989, p.335), in which the tag of crisis "is neither startling nor 
controversial" (Jezer and Miller 1994, p.467). Focusing on the idea that "people who are 
willing and able to spend more money [...] should not have more influence over who is 
elected to office" (Strauss 1994, p.1369); this study raises concerns about the effect of 
the Citizens United (2010) judgement on the US political system. The decision which 
allowed for the "unlimited corporate campaign spending" (Nichols and McChesney 2013, 
p.3), based "on the absurd notion that money is speech [and] corporations are people" 
(Sanders 2016, p.203). Although it still debated whether Citizens United (2010) is the 
cause of the amount of money in US politics "it has the feel of a final straw" (Levitt 2010, 
p.217).  It is the Citizens United (2010) ruling which meant campaign contributions, like 
those discussed in this study, are not illegal acts of corruption. Despite the apparent 
deviation "from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding" (Nye 
1967, p.419) the campaign finance data (CRP 2017) suggests this has been happening 
since 2008 in relation to DAPL. Therefore, the tactics used by lobbyists to get DAPL 
complete were highly influential, but not corrupt. Instead they can be viewed as "tainted 
with corruption" (Lowenstein 1989, p.335). 
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